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Mister Chairman, members of the committee, I am Bruce Thompson, Executive Director Public and Industry Affairs, Forest Oil Corporation. This testimony is submitted on
behalf of the Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA), the American
Petroleum Institute (API), the Domestic Petroleum Council (DPC), the International
Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC), the National Ocean Industries Association
(NOIA), the National Stripper Well Association (NSWA), the Natural Gas Supply
Association (NGSA), the Petroleum Equipment Suppliers Association (PESA), the US
Oil & Gas Association (USOGA), the Association of Energy Service Companies, and 33
cooperating state and regional oil and gas associations. These organizations represent
petroleum and natural gas producers, the segment of the industry that is affected the most
when national energy policy does not recognize the importance of our own domestic
resources.
The purpose of the hearing is to discuss the reasons behind the high price of natural gas,
its effect on the economy and to consider potential solutions. While this testimony will address
these issues in more detail, there are three key points that it will emphasize.
First, the natural gas price situation that is now being addressed was foreseeable and, in
fact, was forewarned.
Second, there are no simple, short-term solutions. However, what has happened can be
the basis for making better policy choices in the future and those choices need to be made.
Third, there will be some who will advocate the failed policies of the past - policies like
limiting the use of natural gas or controlling its price. These choices must be avoided. Their past
failures alone demonstrate that they will not result in the development of the natural gas supply
that is needed to meet demand.
Avoiding Bad Choices
Taking this last point first, the use of natural gas to generate electricity is drawing a
significant amount of current attention. Some question whether natural gas should be the fuel of
choice in most of the new electrical generation capacity. Some have proposed that new natural
gas electricity generation capacity be prohibited. Few seem to recognize that the driving force
behind these investments are the national environmental policies that value the clean burning
benefits of natural gas. Fewer still suggest what alternative energy sources would provide the
new electricity that is needed while maintaining these environmental standards. And
unfortunately, only a tiny number recognize that the new gas fired electricity generating facilities
are 40 to 50 percent more efficient than existing gas fired capacity which allows the same amount
of electricity to be generated with roughly half the volume of natural gas.
Policymakers need to clearly understand the nature of the natural gas industry before
rushing to judgments on limiting its use. Far better solutions are available through
encouragement of conservation and sound expansion of supply.
The Supply Challenge - It Was Foreseeable; It Was Forewarned
Initially, it is important to put the current supply and demand situation in some
perspective. The United States will remain principally dependent on oil and natural gas for the
foreseeable future to meet its energy demands. Recent projections by the Energy Information
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Administration (EIA) show the oil and natural gas will provide for about 65 percent of domestic
energy over the next several decades.
Second, it is essential to recognize that current natural gas prices and supply constraints
are the consequences of past decisions. More importantly, they are the result of failures to
respond to clear forewarnings that action needed to be taken.
Back in 1999, when the National Petroleum Council (NPC) transmitted its Natural Gas
study, it concluded:
The estimated natural gas resource base is adequate to meet this
increasing demandfor many decades.... However, realizing thefull
potentialfor natural gas use in the United States will require focus and
action on certain criticalfactors.
It was a clear signal that action needed to be taken. Moreover, it was a call that was echoed by
those in the industry that have sought greater access to the national resource base. IPAA was one
of those many voices. Looking back at testimony IPAA has presented both before and after the
NPC study, there has been a clear and increasingly urgent call for changes to national policies.
For example, in January 1999, Steve Layton testifying before this Committee about the
damage being done to the domestic oil and natural gas industry from the low oil prices of 199899 described the consequences to domestic natural gas production as follows:
Without this infrastructure it is not only the nation’s oil industry at risk but
its future natural gas use as well. This country has a vision of building a
future on expanded use of clean burning natural gas. The industry has
been challenged to increase natural gas production by about 40 percent that is a net increase of 40 percent. It will require production not only for
that increase but to replace supplies that are depleted during the same
timeframe. It cannot happen without a healthy oil industry. Oil and gas
are found together. They rely on the same tools, the same science, the
same skills, the same financial resources.
In June 2000, Jeny Jordan testifying before this Committee described the increasing
importance of natural gas in domestic energy supply:
1. Natural gas is an increasingly important element of domestic energy
supply. The National Petroleum Council Natural Gas study concluded
that domestic natural gas demand will increase from the current 22
trillion cubic feet per year (Tcf/yr) to 29 Tcf/yr by 2010. Most of this
increase will be needed to fuel expanding electricity generation. The
study concluded that:
U.S. gas demand will be filled with U.S. production, along
with increasing volumes from Canada and a small, but
growing, contribution from liquefied natural gas (LNG)
imports.... Two regions—deepwater Gulf of Mexico and
the Rockies—will contribute most significantly to the new
supply.... U.S. production is projected to increase from 19
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TCF in 1998 to 25 TCF in 2010, and could approach 27
TCF in 2015. Deeper wells, deeper water, and
nonconventional sources will be key to future supply.
Importantly, this study concludes that these future natural gas needs can be
met through domestic resources supplemented by other North American
resources, but only if conditions are met.
He then described the critical need to address access to the national resource base:
For example, we cannot expect to meet our nation’s needs for clean
burning natural gas without reasonable access to the resource. The NPC
Natural Gas study and all other analyses conclude that the Rockies contain
significant extractable reserves of natural gas. Yet, in the Rockies access
is being limited. It is either the unanticipated outcome of laws,
regulations, and plans that unintentionally deny access or the manipulation
of these laws to produce that outcome. In either case, access limitations
are not the result of a clear policy decision. Consequently, we need a
commitment from Congress and the Administration that these types of
constraints will be eliminated or restrained and proper funding will be
provided on a continued basis to allow environmental documents, leases,
and drilling permits to be issued in a timely fashion.
Earlier this year, Diemer True testifying before the House Committee on Resources
summarized the dynamics of the past several years on natural gas supply in 2003:
Going back to year-end 2000, we briefly saw the results of natural gas
supply shortages. As storage dwindled, prices soared and consumers had
to deal with the consequences. The initial phase of that supply-demand
imbalance reflected the effects of low gas prices and unusually low oil
prices in 1998-99 on capital availability to develop domestic natural gas
supply. These historically low petroleum prices resulted in capital
expenditure budget cuts for domestic producers exceeding 30 percent in
1999. The natural gas drilling rig count dropped by over 40 percent at its
lowest point. In 1999, new wells failed to replace existing reserves.
The petroleum price recovery and the industry’s recognition that future
natural gas demand would increase led by more and more electricity
generated by gas powered turbines triggered a robust rebound in drilling
for natural gas. Rig counts went to record levels. But, the lag in new
production caused by the low petroleum prices left a tight market by the
end of 2000. Higher prices resulted in more drilling rigs searching for
natural gas, but production still declined. U.S. natural gas production
today is lower than it was five years ago.
The higher prices also reduced short-term demand. In reality, the
abatement of high natural gas prices resulted from significant demand
decreases not from supply increases.

In the latter months of the 2001, prices had fallen to levels comparable to
the first part of 1999 and rig counts began to fall as well. By year-end
Natural Gas: NYMEX Prices and Rig Count (1998-2003)

2001 rig counts had fallen to April 2000 levels. While rig counts rose to
around 700, they were well below the 1000 rate that was achieved in the
fall of 2001. The implication of these lower rig counts was clear - supply
levels would not be sustainable.
Now, in early 2003, the implication has become reality. Natural gas
supplies have been stressed by a cold winter and natural gas prices are in
the range of $6.00 per thousand cubic feet. Natural gas drilling rig counts
are in the range of 750. Estimates suggest that domestic natural gas
production fell by around 2.8 percent in 2002. Clearly, the challenge
facing natural gas producers is twofold —maintaining existing natural gas
supply and increasing that supply to meet future demand. Access to
federal resources play a significant role in meeting this challenge as well
as barriers to development, which also adversely affects production. This
remains complicated and new events suggest a worsening situation.
Since that testimony, prices have continued at high levels as winter demand drew down
natural gas storage levels. Storage is now being replenished with an expectation that it might
reach normal levels before next winter depending on summer demand. However, the continuing
high prices have put pressure on demand, particularly in the process gas user component of the
industry. Meanwhile, producers are responding with increased drilling activity. Drilling rig
counts are 25 percent higher than they were at the beginning of 2003. Nevertheless, natural gas
that is found today can take from 3 to 18 months to reach the market depending on where it is
found and what infrastructure exists to get it to the market.
Managing
TheShort-Term; Learning From The Past
The challenge now is to determine what options make the most sense to meet short-term
needs and how to alter policies to produce better results in the future. Most frequently, there are
four options that draw the greatest attention:
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• Demand reduction
• Increased use of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
• Development of Alaskan natural gas
• Improvements in the development of lower-48 and offshore natural gas.
It is appropriate, then, to examine each of these.
In the short-term, demand alterations will be the only realistic option if the market
remains as tight as it has been. IPAA believes that attention should be directed toward
conservation measures that can be implemented in the short-term to reduce the pressure that has
occurred in the market and has probably had its greatest effect on the process gas users. This
component of the natural gas marketplace is an important element of the nation’s manufacturing
infrastructure. Because it largely competes in the international marketplace, it is more
susceptible to price shifts and has shown in the past that it can exit the United States if forced to
that choice. In the 2000-2001 period of high natural gas prices, shifts in demand —particularly in
the fertilizer industry - were significant factors in the market that ultimately led to lower prices.
Unfortunately, the dramatic shift that occurred also had the effect of reducing investment in new
supply.
While LNG will grow to be a larger component of the natural gas supply mix, it is not the
panacea that some analysts have seemed to consider it. First, it will take several years for the
necessary investments to be made and for permitting of facilities to take place before significant
growth in its share of the market will occur. Second, these investments will only occur if the
natural gas price justifies them. A precipitous drop in price like that of 2001 would chill interest
in LNG. Regardless, a major impact in supply from imported LNG is years away. Moreover, the
experience of stumbling into the current structure of crude oil imports - with all the reliance on
unstable sources that it entails - should trigger wariness in policymakers about how reliance on
foreign sources of natural gas should be handled.
Although there has been significant interest in the development of Alaskan natural gas
and the pipeline options to deliver it to the lower-48 states, all the estimates of its development
predict that Alaskan natural gas will not be a factor until the next decade.
Consequently, expanding
domestic supplies inevitably requires
better development of the resources in
the lower-48 states and the federal
offshore.
While analyses like the 1999
National Petroleum Council Natural
Gas study and the newly released
EPCA study by the Bureau of Land
Management have focused on the
resources that need to be developed to
meet future demand - particularly with
regard to federal lands - the challenge
of maintaining existing supply has not
received the attention it deserves.
5

The first and perhaps most compelling challenge to maintaining existing supply is coping
with increasing rates of depletion. Conventional natural gas wells begin to deplete as soon as
they begin to produce. But over the past decade, producers have seen average depletion rates
climb from 16 percent per year to 28 percent per year. In somewhat simplified terms, this means
that producers must initiate new production essentially equivalent to the current annual
production from the Western and Central Gulf of Mexico each year just to stay even. New
technologies like 3-D seismic enable explorationists to find smaller reservoirs. Enhanced
production technologies like horizontal drilling are allowing better and more environmentally
effective development of reserves. But finding smaller reserves and producing them more
effectively makes the challenge of maintaining existing natural gas supply more difficult.
Second, it is important to understand the extent of development of the existing resource
base. Some opponents of accessing additional federal lands suggest that the current resource
base should be the first focus. In reality, it already is. Developing the current resource base for
both conventional and unconventional natural gas is the source of existing supply. When the rig
count grew to 1000, this is where it had to grow. But this resource base has supplied natural gas
for the past 50 plus years. These mature reserves are harder and more costly to develop. New
reserves in these areas are smaller and deplete faster or are deeper and more costly to develop.
But, there is no doubt that these resources will continue to be developed as quickly as access is
provided, natural gas prices justify development and capital is available to do so.
Policymakers need to understand these implications clearly. These are the conditions that
are defining the current supply and demand balance. Not only must they be addressed, but the
industry must also be capable of increasing natural gas supply to meet future increased demand.
Natural gas consumption is expected to grow by almost 50 percent by 2025. While recent
events may have slowed the pace of this growth - an issue that is being assessed again by the
National Petroleum Council - future natural gas consumption will likely grow at a pace that will
require an energy policy that allows the full potential of natural gas to be developed. This cannot
be done without more access to, and development of, government-controlled resources.
However, development of these resources remains a substantial challenge.
Offshore - Western and Central Gulf of Mexico
2SH
These portions of the Gulf of
Mexico have proven to be a worldUS Gulf of
class area for natural gas as well as
Mexico Natural
petroleum production, accounting
Gas Production
for over 25 percent of domestic
natural gas production. Production
comes from the continental shelf,
the deepwater, and the emerging
ultra-deepwater. The NPC study
projects that future production
increases in these areas is essential
to meet projected demand.
However, future production
increases will hinge on federal
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offshore policies. The most significant of these in the Western and Central Gulf of Mexico relate
to royalty policies. However, improvements to coastal zone management review policies could
also help avoid costly delays in developing new supplies.
Legislation reported by this committee includes a number of provisions designed to
enhance exploration and production in this offshore region. These include:
■ Provisions for royalty incentives in the Western and Central Gulf of Mexico. It should
parallel and extend the relief now being provided administratively in recent lease sales those occurring after the House passed its bill.
■ Provisions to address deep drilling for natural gas on existing leases
■ Provisions to create additional authority to develop RIK programs that will allow for
more effective use of the highly desirable approach. RIK eliminates the complexities of
determining the royalty value thereby saving both the government and the producer
from the convoluted determinations that are now necessary and are frequently
questioned - sometimes years after the sales occur. Offshore production is particularly
suited for royalty-in-kind (RIK) - paying the royalty with production instead of dollars.
It is a more economical and fairer approach. Recent actions to fill the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve could utilize 80 percent of this offshore royalty oil. RIK should be
encouraged for natural gas.
■ Provisions for royalty relief for marginal wells on both federal onshore and offshore
properties for both oil and natural gas. This relief encourages the continued production
of these wells in times of low oil and/or natural gas prices. Retaining production from
these wells is in the national interest and the provision should be included in the final
bill.
Offshore - Eastern Gulf of Mexico, Atlantic Ocean, and California
Developing the substantial
domestic natural gas resources in most of
Resource Estimates - Restricted Areas
these three areas is prohibited by
Estimated Percentage Restricted
moratoria. President Clinton extended
these moratoria for another ten years in
1998 saying, "First, it is clear we must
save these shores from oil drilling." This
is a flawed argument ignoring the state of
current technology; it results in these
moratoria preventing natural gas
development as well as oil. In fact, both
the Eastern Gulf and the Atlantic
resources are viewed as gas resource
areas, not oil —those coasts are not at
environmental risk. Too often, these
policies are predicated on the events that occurred 30 years ago. For example, no Eastern Gulf of
Mexico sale occurred from 1988 to 2001. The recent sale took place only under greatly reduced
conditions.
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However, this year another ominous step was taken when the federal government decided
to purchase leases that have not been developed, primarily due to regulatory limitations, in the
Eastern Gulf of Mexico. This action led to calls for similar purchases off the coast of California
and on other government controlled land. While the merits of each case should be reviewed,
following such a course also serves to limit the available resource base at a time when it needs to
be expanded.
Federal policy needs to be reconsidered. It needs to be based on a sound understanding of
today's technology. When the NPC analyzed natural gas resources that were being inhibited by
regulation of these areas, it concluded that over 70 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in these areas
are precluded from development. Unfortunately, as soon as any discussion of offshore
development begins, a barrage of reaction occurs claiming that any such discussion threatens the
resort based economies of those coastal states - a consequence that has failed to occur in those
states where offshore development exists and resort economies also thrive. IPAA commends the
Senate for rejecting a recent amendment that would have eliminated a provision in the current
Senate bill that authorizes an inventory of offshore energy resources.
Onshore Restrictions - A Mosaic of Regulations and Prohibitions
Much of the onshore natural gas resource base is located in the Intermountain West. Yet,
much of this resource base is constrained. And, it is clear that this area is a critical battleground
between those who seek to develop domestic natural gas and those who seek to prevent
development. Not only must energy producers navigate through a mosaic of regulatory
constraints, producers must now deal with a series of strategic efforts to delay and prevent the
necessary use of these national resources.
The regulatory framework to obtain permits to develop energy resources on federal lands
is layered with complex and sometimes conflicting requirements. Federal Land Managers must
operate through Resource Management Plans (RMPs) that require extensive Environmental
Impact Statements (EISs). These address a wide variety of impacts regarding the use of the land.
Formulating these RMPs and EISs requires consultation and, in some cases, concurrence with
other federal agencies and the states. These agencies, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
are tasked with implementing laws, like the Endangered Species Act (ESA), that do not consider
the balance needed between their wildlife management objectives and national energy needs.
Yet, the Federal Land Manager is developing a plan in most cases for multiple use federal lands.
This process creates
delay, confusion, and conflict.
A 2003 Interior Department study confirms limitations on natural gas access in the
Intermountain West This chart shows almost 40% offederal gas resources have
It produces a series of access
some barrier that prevents development.
and development limitations.
P ercent of N atural G as R esources
Collectively, the effects are
ED No Leasing (Statutory/Executive Order)
significant. TheNPC’s
■ No Leasing (Administrative, Pending Land Use Plan)
S I No Leasing (Administrative)
Natural Gas study estimated
f l Leasing. No Surface Occupancy
that access to 137 trillion cubic
■ Leasing, Cumulative Timing Limitations on Drilling >9 Months
feet of natural gas in the
■ Leasing. Cumulative Timing LlmSations on Drilling 6-9 Months
M Leasing. Cumulative Timing Limitations on Drtling 3.6 Months
Intermountain West was
M Leasing. Cumulative Timing Limitations on Dflling <3 Months
limited by regulation. Taking a
EE! Leasing. Controlled S urface Use
M Leasing. S tandard L ease Terms
different approach, the Bureau
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of Land Management (BLM) released its EPCA access report and reached a conclusion that
roughly 40 percent of the natural gas resources in the federal lands it studied was restricted.
Moreover, these studies were largely focused on constraints that exist at the leasing phase of the
process. Even in those areas where the EPCA study suggests that there are no stipulations, that
assessment applies only at the leasing level. When Applications for Permits to Drill (APDs) are
sought, stipulations can still be required. Such stipulations can be extensive. For example, at
one southwestern Wyoming site that was analyzed, stipulations effectively limit operations to
only about six weeks per year.
A Mosaic of Seasonal Restrictions (Souce: PAMS)
There are no simple
answers to this issue or a single
solution that will address the
problems. What is required is
a commitment to develop these
access policies with a full
recognition of the importance
of developing the natural gas
resource. The National Energy
Policy recognized the
magnitude of these limitations.
Executive Orders to consider
energy supply implications in
federal decision making and to convene a task force to improve permitting are important first
steps in developing a response. These early efforts have resulted in specific tasks within various
Executive Branch departments that should improve the permitting process.
Adequate agency funding and staffing is needed at the key field offices responsible for
permitting and it needs to be directed toward the permitting process. Lack of funding has limited
the ability of the agencies to permit, to monitor permits, and to enforce permit requirements leading to consequences that encourage conflicts between the different users of federal land. It
has resulting in shifting the federal responsibility for developing EISs and other National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements to private parties where it was never intended to
reside.
But the direct permitting aspect of addressing these access issues is only one part of a
much larger debate. Besides these issues, energy producers are also confronting broad and
aggressive efforts to otherwise delay or prevent access - strategies of misdirection, of litigation,
and of division. Congress needs to recognize these efforts for what they are and react
accordingly.
Prior to the EPCA study, development opponents consistently used a strategy of
misdirection. They alternated between suggesting that the issues of federal land access were
related to opening national monuments or that 95 percent of the federal lands were open to
permitting and there was no issue. The EPCA study has helped focus the debate on the real areas
of concern - federal lands available for multiple use and the restrictive lease stipulations that
inhibit their use. But, even with this new information, it is likely that development opponents
will try to minimize the very significant issues associated with land use stipulations.
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It is equally clear that development opponents are undertaking an aggressive strategy of
litigation to thwart access in the Intermountain West. When the EPCA study was released, the
reaction was quick and certain:
"Ifyou bid on a lease on public land, you can expect (environmental
litigation)."- Peter Morton, The Wilderness Society, Dow-Jones
Newswires, January 21, 2003
The federal government is now confronted with litigation threats and actions at every step in its
process. Litigation has been filed to prevent exploration activities designed to identify possible
resources. Litigation is filed over granting permits, challenging existing RMPs and opposing
revisions to EISs. The primary result of this litigation is delay and more delay - and no new
energy supplies. Delay is a key component of the strategy. Energy producers must invest capital,
must replace and expand their production. If opponents to development can forestall access, it
forces producers to shift their investment elsewhere. The longer producers are delayed, the
higher the likelihood that they will give up on an area. This is the ultimate objective of this
strategy of litigation, but it is ultimately a strategy that costs the nation domestic natural gas and
impacts our energy security.
The circumstances surrounding efforts to develop resources —particularly coal bed
natural gas - in the Powder River Basin of Wyoming and Montana can demonstrate the type and
magnitude of these challenges. The events in this area have unfolded over the past two decades
and present an unfortunately characteristic pattern of the problems confronting natural gas
development in the Intermountain West. Following is a chronological review of the events in the
Powder River Basin.
Timeline for Powder River Basin (PRB) Oil and Gas Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS)
1985 & 1986
Buffalo & Platte River Resource Management Plans (RMPs) are
approved. Neither of the plans specifically addresses coal bed natural gas
drilling.
1992 -1997

Buffalo RMP is revisited and evaluated. The evaluation results in
determining that the RMP planning and management decisions are still
valid.

Throughout 1990's

Environmental analyses are conducted on a variety of coal bed natural
gas project proposals in compliance with NEPA. Each of the analyses
covered the effects of the proposed actions and alternatives, including the
cumulative effects of the projects combined with other development and
actions within the area. Based on these analyses, it was determined that
amendments to the Buffalo RMP were not necessary.

March 1998

BLM begins an EIS to analyze the development of 3,000 to 5,000 coal
bed natural gas wells in the Wyodak project area of the Powder River
Basin. During development of the EIS, coal bed natural gas drilling on
state and private lands increases dramatically in the PRB.
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May & June 2000

BLM announces its intent to conduct an environmental impact analysis of
oil and gas development in the PRB. Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS
published in the Federal Register on June 21, 2000.

August 2000

BLM determines that levels of development approved in the Record of
Decision, analyzed in the Wyodak EIS, have been reached. BLM will no
longer approve Applications for Permits to Drill (APDs) for coal bed
natural gas wells on federal lands and/or minerals within the PRB. BLM
essentially places an embargo on new coal bed natural gas development
on federal lands in the PRB. Coal bed natural gas projects on state and
private lands are allowed to proceed.

January 2002

Draft EISs (DEIS) issued for coal bed natural gas development in the
PRB in Wyoming and in the entire State of Montana.

May 2002

Public comment period on the DEIS closed. Over 17,000 comment
letters were received on the two documents. US EPA Region 8 Office
questions the validity of the DEIS.

January 2003

Final EISs issued for coal bed natural gas development in the PRB and
the State of Montana. One month protest period announced for both
documents.

April 30, 2003

Record of Decision (ROD) regarding oil and natural gas development in
the PRB and Montana issued by the BLM. The ROD will allow up to
51,000 coal bed natural gas wells to be drilled in the entire region.
Coalition of environmental groups and landowners file suit in Montana to
block implementation of the ROD.

May 1, 2003

Suit attempting to block implementation of ROD pending in the courts.
No stay preventing approval of APDs has been granted.
The history of the Powder River Basin EIS process presents two particularly perplexing issues.
The first occurred when the EPA Region 8 Office raised objections to the DEIS after it had been
under development for several years. This raises serious questions regarding the procedures used
by the federal government in addressing energy permitting. The second issue is now unfolding.
Clearly, there is a strategy of litigation being pursued to prevent development of the federal
resource base in the Powder River Basin. However, while the tactic is clear, the courts have not
succumbed to the strategy by issuing a stay of permitting. Nevertheless, a large backlog of APDs
exists at the BLM and there appears to be no movement to expedite approval of these APDs. It
appears that the BLM is self-imposing a stay on permitting.
Present

The pending Senate legislation includes provisions to address the first of these issues. A
pilot program is included that would enhance the coordination between the various federal
agencies in the most active field offices. The intent of these provisions is to avoid future
situations where one federal agency prevents another federal agency from carrying out its energy
leasing and permitting activities because it was not involved in the EIS process early in its
development. This approach offers the potential for improved federal agency interactions.
Similar efforts are being developed by the administration’s energy permit streamlining task force.
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However, these efforts only address the leasing and permitting process from the federal
agency perspective. The larger question that the Congress and the administration must consider
is whether more direct efforts are necessary to either compel or allow action in the face of the
strategies that are being used to prevent development of the federal resource base. Other
proposals have been suggested to force timely agency action. In the past proposals have been
developed based on peril points where conditions are so critical that the President would be
authorized to alter procedural requirements while maintaining substantive environmental
protections.
Congress has an opportunity to address these other limitations. It can provide an
improved process to assure that environmentally sound natural gas development can occur. If
Congress believes that the current natural gas market situation - high prices, concerns over
adequate natural gas supply - warrants more aggressive approaches to the leasing and permitting
processes on federal lands, it has the power to create such processes.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this perspective on the challenges facing natural
gas production in the United States.
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